social action



U.S. policy toward China

social action

March, 1960

contents



- 4 CHINA SINCE 1949 by Earle H. Ballou
- SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?

By "Mo-tse"

- 21 CHURCH LIFE IN CHINA TODAY By Francis P. Jones
- 26 TWO STATEMENTS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA
 - DEPARTMENTS
 - · Editorial, 3
 - · Book Reviews, 30
 - Program Planning, 33
 - · Resources for Worship, 34
 - · Social Action Calendar, 36
- FERN BABCOCK, Editor ELIZABETH HENLEY, Assistant to the Editor CHESTER TANAKA, Art Editor EDITORIAL BOARD: Walter S. Press, Chairman; Elmer J. F. Arndt; Mrs. John C. Bennett; Richard M. Fagley; Ray Gibbons; Huber F. Klemme; Herman F. Reissig; F. Nelsen Schlegel; and Daniel Day Williams.
- Subscriptions, \$2.00 per year; \$3.75 for two years; \$5.00 for three years; five or more yearly subscriptions to one address at \$1.50 each; single copies, 25c; 10 to 99 copies at 20c; 100 or more copies at 15c. Editorial and Subscription Offices, 289 Park Avenue South, New York 10, New York Copyright, 1960 by the COUNCIL FOR CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ACTION.
- Social Action is published monthly except in June, July and August by the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, which continues the work of the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches and of the Commission on Christian Social Action of the Evangelical and Reformed Church. Chairman, hugo w. Thompson; Vice-Chairman, henry c. koch: Director, Ray gibbons; Associate Director, Huber F. Klemme; International Relations, Herman F. Reissig; Racial and Cultural Relations, R. W. Raber and Galen R. Weaver; Field Secretary, F. Nelsen Schlegel; and Publications, Ferrn Barcock Offices: 289 Park Avenue South, New York 10, New York and 2969 West 25th Street, Cleveland 13, Ohio Publication Office: 10th & Scull Streets, Lebanon, Pa. Re-entered as second class matter August, 1957 at the Post Office at Lebanon, Pa., under the act of March 3, 1879.



editorial



TIES OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN CHINA AND THE U.S.A. were strong for many years. Thousands of American missionaries spent their lives in China. Thousands of Chinese students studied in colleges and universities in this country. More than a hundred thousand Americans are of Chinese ancestry. These ties were cut when the Communist Government came to power.

The present policy of the U.S.A. is to support the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek on the island of Taiwan, not to recognize the Communist Government, and to attempt to keep it out of the United Nations. Many factors lead thoughtful Christians to ask whether this policy should be continued: China is the most populous nation in the world; the Communist regime is proving itself to be the effective government of China; diplomatic recognition of a government need not imply approval of it, but may be the best way to deal with it; world opinion might exert stronger pressure on China if she were in rather than out of the United Nations.

In February 1959, the Council for Christian Social Action issued a statement setting forth conditions under which "world order, justice and peace would . . . be better served by the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and its recognition by our Government, than by continuing the present situation" (see pages 27-29).

THIS ISSUE gives our readers opportunity to consider whether the present U.S. policy toward China should be continued or changed; and, if so, under what conditions. Earle M. Ballou describes the changes that have taken place in China since the Communists came to power in 1949. A knowledgeable but anonymous member of the staff of the United Church of Christ describes the present policy of the U.S. and discusses the conditions which might lead toward recognition. Francis P. Jones describes Protestant church life in China today. Everett M. Stowe reviews five current books that illuminate the present situation in China. Ministers and others responsible for planning meetings on this important subject will find program suggestions and resources for worship on pages 33 and 34.

China since 1949



SEMENSHA DAM, YELLOW RIVER • PHOTO BY CARTIER-BRESSON, FROM MAGNUM-PHOTOS.

The Communists rode into control of China on a great wave of resurgent nationalism." So reported Dr. J. Leighton Stuart in the autumn of 1949 shortly after returning from his post as American Ambassador to China. It was an accurate explanation of a political overturn that astonished much of the world.

Today it can be said with equal accuracy that the Communists have been able to retain and extend their control because of what they have accomplished, and continue to accomplish in enlarging the national consciousness of the Chinese people. The people of China, from the poor farmer to the returned student and the successful businessman, feel that at long last their na-

By Rev. Earle H. Ballou, China Consultant to the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches. Mr. Ballou has just returned from Hong Kong where he spent five months as the interim Director of Church World Service. He undertook this assignment after his retirement as Executive Secretary of the Congregational Christian Service Committee. He was a missionary in China from 1916 to 1948, with the exception of twenty-one months of internment by the Imperial Japanese Army and a brief period of service in this country.

tion is taking the position in the world which rightfully belongs to it. Even those most strongly opposed to the methods of the People's Government take pride, secret if not open, in what has been accomplished.

WHY DID THE COMMUNISTS COME TO POWER?

No people have ever been more proud of their national heritage. Through all the years of defeat and disappointment stretching over more than a century of frustration and humiliation, the conviction was almost universal that China was still the country at the Center of the World—"Middle Kingdom." The literal meaning of the characters for China is "The Country in the Middle"; and the rest of the relatively unenlightened world is to be found on the outer fringes of it. At length, that deep and almost universal feeling of superiority has been given promise of fulfillment. If sacrifice is the inescapable price of a climb up from the degradation in which China found herself a dozen years ago, the people can be persuaded to pay it, because they believe the value received is correspondingly high.

The Central Government had decayed

It is difficult for one who was not in China at the time to appreciate the deepening despair that filled the land in the years immediately following World War II. The radiant morn of the victory over Japan quickly passed away. The nation was plagued by inflation, administrative inefficiency, widespread though by no means universal corruption, and the exasperating effectiveness of Communist interference with all efforts at reconstruction. Chiang Kai-shek and his government never really had a chance. It had suffered too long from "the diseases of defeat." Kenneth Latourette was undoubtedly correct in saying that by the end of the War the Central Government had reached such a stage of decay that no amount of help from America or anywhere else could have saved the situation—and the amount of American help has been grossly overestimated.

It seems that the fabric of stable government had been worn so thin and was so rotted by decay that a prop applied at any particular point did nothing but tear a hole in that part of the structure it was attempting to support; the rent was enlarged, and the last state was worse than the first.

More and more persons began to feel that things were so bad

that they could hardly be worse even if the communists should take control. Armed bands of aggressive, high spirited marauders made life exceedingly inconvenient for city dwellers. The railroads were disrupted—"annihilation" was the word used by one American aviator who surveyed the route of the Tientsin-Pukow railway. Electrical service was interrupted almost every night. The generating plants were outside the cities where transmission lines could be cut under cover of darkness.

Any change, even to Communist rule, gave promise of being an improvement. The will to resist faded away. The only actual resistance was being made by underpaid and for the most part poorly led soldiers whose morale fell steadily before the fervor and diabolically clever strategy of the "Communist bandits"—who after all were fellow Chinese and might be right.

The revolution brought immediate improvements

When the change finally began to take place on a large scale shortly before the end of 1948 it was indeed an improvement. One of the astonishing things about the whole revolution was the rapidity with which forces and policies that had been almost completely destructive immediately became universally constructive. As each successive city fell to the new regime fear and opposition melted away before the reasonableness and effectiveness of the reforms which were introduced from the very day that the new rulers assumed power. The so-called "Liberation" must be understood as a revolution, beside which the fall of the Manchus in 1911 and the accession to power of the Kuomintang in 1928 were minor alterations in direction.

The new rulers were brilliantly served by secret agents who had been preparing for their advent, often while filling posts of trust under the old regime. Information as to what needed to be done and who could be trusted to do it was available, and was acted upon at once. Reforms were introduced that produced visible effects. Enthusiastic students who had long been hoping for "liberation" by the new government were enlisted and became ardent missionaries of the new order.

Streets became cleaner than ever before. Railroads were restored to operation with a speed that had been pronounced utterly impossible by engineers who had so recently lamented their destruction. Restrictions were imposed on personal liberty

in the interests of the public good; their acceptance by the populace was made easier by careful explanations of the reasons for them. General improvement in tone was shortly discernible at all levels of public service—from the humble operator of a pedicab up through the attendants on railroad trains and the policeman on point duty, to the men who, without formal legal training or judicial experience, dispensed rough justice at trials. The people were dazzled by the early reforms. Millions who had tried to maintain an uneasy position on the fence decided to climb down on the side of cooperation with the new government.

Reforms won new adherents

The first urban centers to be captured by the Communists, at the turn of the year 1948-49, were the northern cities of Tsinan, Tientsin and Peking. As news of what was happening to them spread down through the country, opposition melted away. The fears of the adherents of the old order were not fulfilled; the hopes of those who had been secretly or more openly awaiting the new government were far surpassed in the event. Why hold out longer when success was coming so rapidly to the forces of "liberation"? Why struggle against the wave of the future?

In the summer of 1948, the Central Government made one last effort to give stability to an already hopeless financial situation by the introduction of the Gold Yuan. It failed dismally. The way in which dishonest officials profited at the expense of citizens who trusted the Generalissimo's government marked the approach of the end.

The new government was hailed with enthusiasm

After the fall of Shanghai in March 1949 all effective resistance ceased. On October 1, 1949 the People's Government was formally established in Peking. "Liberation" was celebrated with parades and popular enthusiasm, the like of which had never been seen before. A new era had begun for China. Despite many uncertainties as to what the future would bring, all but a few felt that in some way the new regime would restore to China a status more in keeping with her real deserts. As a Professor of English explained a year and a half later, "Now we can again be proud to be Chinese."

Restrictions on personal liberty often irked the people

To be sure, the glow of those first months of the new order began gradually to fade. While most promises continued to be fulfilled there were disappointments as well. Many of those who hailed the new government must have found irksome the accompanying restrictions on personal liberty.

For generations the Chinese have been as strongly individualistic as any people who have ever lived. They found some aspects of the new regime hard to take: the tight organization of community life whereby you were supposed to keep watch on someone else lest he fail to cooperate in all the projects for promoting the general welfare, and someone else kept watch on you; the way in which children were filled with such ardor for the new regime that they denounced to the authorities any hesitancy of their elders to comply with regulations; the enormous amount of time devoted to political education, some of which seemed to make sense and some of which certainly did not; the assertive arrogance of many so-young cadres of the Party who were clothed with a brief authority which often took the place of formal law.

Crimes against the common welfare were punished severely

The vigor, not to say ruthlessness, with which the several "anti" campaigns were prosecuted must have been startling to many. Yet while injustice was undoubtedly done to thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of people, tens of thousands of others got little in punishment beyond what they deserved; and perhaps as many more, if they were not actually guilty of the offenses for which they were put on trial, merited no less severe treatment for others sins against the common good that were never uncovered.

As Bertrand Russell noted years ago, there has always been in the Chinese character a strain of callousness to suffering bordering on cruelty. The rapaciousness of landlords in many parts of the country, where land reform was a prerequisite to any progress, had to be dealt with severely. The same was true of bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and leakage of government economic secrets, which were the targets of the "Five Anti Campaign" of the early fifties. There is, however, no discoverable basis for

the inflated estimates, running as high as the ridiculous figure of fifty million, of those who were actually "liquidated."

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S.A.

Many thousands of Chinese were greatly disappointed by the unwillingness of the U.S.A. to accept a simple matter of fact and give diplomatic recognition either de jure or de facto, to the new regime. The People's Government was firmly established by October 1, 1949 and had secured as firm a grip on the country as any Chinese regime had had since long before the days of the Tai Ping Rebellion. It had been taken for granted, even by those who didn't like the People's Government, that formal recognition by the United States must soon follow. What would have been the course of events if there had been recognition before June 25, 1950 is a subject for vast speculation. The possibility can never be entirely ruled out that, with our foot in the door, developments might have been more favorable, not only for us but for the other Western countries which had already granted recognition, Great Britain included.

June 25, 1950 came, the Korean War began, and the full force of China's arsenal of propaganda was turned upon us. The results were disastrous. Korea gave Mao Tse-tung and his comrades opportunity for achieving one of their prime objectives: to create in the minds of the Chinese people an image of the United States as the chief embodiment of all that they must repudiate and overthrow. That imperialism, feudalism, capitalism, contempt for the people of Asia, interference in the affairs of smaller helpless nations, love of war and aggression were traits basic to all policies and actions of the American Government was dinned into the ears and eyes of the Chinese people. The pressure must have been irresistible. Even if one at first didn't believe it, one dared not deny it.

Previously, millions of Chinese would have had no opinion or would have regarded the United States as the one western power that on the whole had been decent and even friendly towards China. Gradually they were persuaded that what they heard all the time and never heard denied must be true. The result is one of the supreme ironies of modern history. A nation which a decade ago was the most highly regarded by the Chinese is now the most feared, hated and despised.

EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The ability of the People's Government to transform an attitude of friendliness toward the U.S.A. to hatred is one measure of the control that it exercises over the people.

The government is totalitarian and despotic

The government is not only totalitarian in that all aspects of life have been brought under it; it is also as despotic and absolute as that of any tyranny of modern or medieval times. Its authority reaches down to the level of such everyday concerns as whether a farmer shall raise tomatoes or eggplants, and in what quantities.

The government proclaims a "great leap forward" and hardly a village in the entire land does not jump, and keep on jumping, in the effort to exceed the quotas set for that area. For many, enthusiasm for the program is both genuine and sustained.

Criticism was invited; then rejected

The leader, Mao Tse-tung, suggested that the flowers of criticism be permitted to bloom, but when the crop far exceeded expectations in both quantity and quality a halt was called and all who ventured to express ideas not in accord with governmental preferences were marked for remedial "education." At the beginning of its assumption of power the government promised "freedom of religious belief." But it soon made clear that "political matters are of first importance," "Party leadership must be followed without qualification" and that "when the goal is correct one does not pick and choose among methods for achieving it"—which is only another way of saying that the end justifies the means.

The grip of a thoroughgoing tyranny based on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist principles has been steadily tightened. Yet by the ruthless application of such tyrannical methods China has forged ahead until it begins to look as if even her Big Brother to the West is becoming alarmed as to who will be running the show a few years hence.

The government made some errors in judgment

There have been occasional egregious errors of calculation or judgment. One of them was the hysterical emphasis placed on steel production which resulted in the setting up of innumerable small blast furnaces all over the country. Probably most of the pig-iron produced was nearly useless.

Another error was the haste with which almost three quarters of a million collectives were merged into about twenty-five thousand communes. These were supposed to consist of between five and ten thousand families each, and would eventually replace the age-long village and family structure of rural life. There have been greatly exaggerated reports of the separation of the sexes, a variant scheme which was attempted in only a few instances. Chairman Mao and his lieutenants have had to slow down these radical transformations of society. However, the ultimate purpose has not been abandoned.

Mistakes in planning and the failure of nature to cooperate with Peking have meant repeated food shortages. Long queues of discontented people have waited for hours to secure sadly inadequate allotments of the necessities of life. One consequence has been that well over a million Chinese have "voted against Communism with their feet" by electing the drab "freedom" of refugee existence in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

What does the balance sheet of the past decade show?

There are two and a half million men in the People's Liberation Army backed by millions more in reserves and militia. There are 2,500 planes in the air force of which at least 1,800 are jets. Four or five times as much coal is mined annually as during the best pre-Communist year. It may well be that the claim is justified that Shanghai alone now turns out more textiles per year than does all of the United Kingdom. China's foreign trade has more than doubled. Railway and highway mileage has been tripled. Cities like Peking and Shanghai have doubled in population. Foreign and domestic trained Chinese engineers, scientists, and managers are rapidly taking over the specialized tasks of the country; consultants from Russia and elsewhere who were formerly counted by the thousands are now numbered by the hundreds. Despite some of the grossly exaggerated reports of the achievements of the "great leap forward" China's agricultural production for 1959 may have been twice that of 1949; and her total industrial output ten times that of 1949

One explanation of such rapid growth in the economy is that

literacy has risen from less than 20% to about 75%. One hundred million children and young people are in schools, which is four times as many as there were in 1949. Nearly one hundred thousand students graduate each year from universities and other institutions of higher learning.

Perhaps the most loyal as well as the most vociferous adherents of the new order are to be found among the youthful students. It is upon them that the government relies heavily for success in the future. The present situation is better than anything most of these young people have ever known before. More than half the people of China were born after 1930. The Japanese invasion began only seven years later. It brought catastrophic ruin to the hopes for developing a real democracy. It is not surprising that many of the boys and girls would acknowledge kinship with those of another revolutionary age of whom it was written:

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, And to be young was very heaven.

Few older people would deny that the past decade has been costly in many ways. Life has been hectic: for many it has been fearful. For not a few it has been tragic. For all it seems, as a discerning visitor from France has put it, to have been life in a "state of hypertension." He compares China to a "feverish adolescent driving himself too hard, every gesture proclaiming his exaltation."

Yet, it is possible for people of another background, more familiar with the scene around them than any casual visitor can be, to catch something of the spirit which still informs so much of China's recent history. A letter from the wife of an Anglo-Saxon teacher in a government institution described with enthusiasm an expedition of several weeks which her family had shared with a group of Chinese students. Late in the autumn, they had gone into the mountainous countryside to help the farmers reach one of the local goals of the "great leap forward." She concluded her letter by saying that her children had begun the study of Russian as well as Chinese. In this way they will "grow up with the three most important languages—quite apart from living in the most advanced society in human history." The world has to reckon with the fact that many people in China really believe what that foreigner said.

Should the

change its
policy toward
the People's
Republic
of China?

T wo comments suggest themselves immediately as one faces the question of the policy of the United States toward the People's Republic of China. First, it might be better to speak quite plainly about "Red China" rather than of the "People's Republic." This is a totalitarian Communist state, not a people's government.

By "Mo-tse." (A staff member of the United Church of Christ who has had experience in China has chosen as a pseudonym the name of an ancient Chinese philosopher whose political doctrine combined universal good will with utilitarianism.)

Second, the honest response to this question must be, "Nobody knows." I don't, nor does the Council for Christian Social Action, nor Allen Dulles nor President Eisenhower. No American can be sure what the effect is on China's rulers of the present United States policy, nor what results might follow from a change. Mao Tse-tung may know, but he isn't talking.

We are really looking, then, for a well educated guess about our China policy. To make it we must know both the relevant facts and also what it is we are trying to accomplish. The foreign policy of a nation is a calculated effort to achieve certain goals. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. It is not the abstract "rightness" of a policy but its effectiveness in securing good results that determines whether or not Christians should give it their support.

Goals of U.S. policy

What are the goals or values toward which our nation's foreign policy should be oriented? Three are paramount: peace, freedom and justice in the world. Note that American national interest is *not* paramount. As Christians we are barred from making our *separate* national interest the prime goal of policy. Of course, the interests of our nation must be considered as a part of the human community.

At this time, peace, freedom and justice for mankind seem to require two things: first, the reinforcement of the factors making for world order—processes of negotiation, mechanism for settling disputes, the elimination of situations in which naked power confronts naked power; second, the continuation of strength in the non-Communist (not necessarily anti-Communist) nations. This means maintaining the effective power of the United States as a leader of the free world, and equally the stability, prosperity and capacity for self-defense on the part of other free peoples.

Reworded, therefore, our question now reads: "On the basis of the best available knowledge, is a change in the present American policy toward Red China calculated to reinforce the processes of orderly negotiation in international affairs, and to strengthen the non-Communist nations? What kind of change would best accomplish these ends? What is the best way to move toward such change?"

PRESENT POLICY OF THE U.S. TOWARD CHINA

Before answering questions about changing our policy toward China, we must understand the American policy now in effect. Generally speaking, it is a policy aimed at weakening China by isolating her economically and politically, and of threatening the Red regime by building up power hostile to it, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan. We refuse to trade with Red China and try to prevent others from doing so. We withhold diplomatic recognition and exert strong efforts to keep her out of the United Nations. This has been our position since 1951.

In the election year of 1952 Republican leaders talked of "rolling back Communism" and later the President spoke of "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek." But during its years in office the Eisenhower administration has quietly changed its mind. A massive shift has taken place with reference to all the Communist powers except China. Symbols of this great change are: acceptance of summit meetings, numerous visits by high-ranking officials back and forth across the Iron Curtain, large-scale tourism, and a general theme of peace and co-existence in the utterances of both Russian and American leaders.

Yet we maintain a policy toward Red China which has not altered substantially in nine years. Why? Briefly, the reasons given by the Department of State for this rigidity are:

- The Red regime in China is shaky. Exerting continuous hostile pressure upon it will hasten its passing. American recognition would cut the nerve of resistance on the part of hundreds of millions of Chinese who are waiting only for an opportunity to rid themselves of their present government.
- Red China has a bad record in international affairs. In particular, it is unpurged of its aggression in Korea. To seat it in the United Nations while thus unregenerate would greatly weaken that organization and the cause of world order.
- Recognition would reinforce communist propaganda. For Red China to win a seat in the United Nations and recognition by the United States would give credence to the communist contention that it represents the wave of the future and that to stand against it is hopeless and suicidal. This in turn would weaken the resistance of its Asian neighbors to aggression and subversion. Furthermore, millions of influential Chinese living in southeast Asia would be propelled into the arms of Peking.

- Recognition would betray Nationalist China. More friendly relations with Red China would constitute a betrayal of our staunch ally, Chiang Kai-shek. We are committed to uphold him as representing the true government and interests of the Chinese people.
- Peking is implacably hostile toward the United States. Therefore, recognition would do no good. Communist China is wedded to an alliance with Russia.

To these considerations, one might add a sixth argument for maintaining a relentless economic and political pressure on China. Would not a reversal of American policy encourage Communist leaders, already half-drunk with success, in dangerous illusions of omnipotence? If they were given evidence that the United States is unable to stand up against them and is indeed only a "paper tiger," they might be tempted into increasingly flagrant ventures of aggression, which could easily touch off a catastrophic war.

EVALUATION OF U.S. POLICY

Now let us examine more closely these reasons given in support of the present policy of the United States Government toward the People's Republic of China:

Strength of the Communist regime

Available evidence runs strongly against the contention that the Peking regime is shaky and that there is widespread and effective revolutionary sentiment against it. On the contrary, Mao's government has developed a remarkably complete system of control which has substantial popular support. There is even pride in China's achievements and enthusiasm for Peking's program. Undoubtedly there is also considerable resentment of certain aspects of that program: for example, the extreme regimentation in the communes. It is also true that large numbers of Chinese refugees and prisoners of war have "voted with their feet" against the regime. The "100 flowers" of popular criticism which bloomed so luxuriantly in 1957 were quickly chopped off, but probably the roots still remain.

The best way to evaluate the domestic position of the Red Chinese Government is by comparing it with the position of the Communist regime in Russia. The latter is certainly criticized and perhaps even resisted to some degree. Yet no one seriously expects a revolution against it; it is accepted as the government representing the nationhood of the Russian people. Our policy toward Russia starts with this fact and assumes that terms of co-existence will have to be worked out for an indefinite period. This is where a realistic and effective China policy must begin also.

Need for the reinstatement of China in world affairs

Granting that Red China has a bad record in international affairs, how is she to purge herself of her sins and be rehabilitated? It is the future, not the past, which primarily concerns us. Realistic proposals for settlement in the Korean theatre must therefore be developed and actively pushed as part of a total strategy for relating Red China and the free world. In this connection we must be careful not to overstate the case against Peking. Many of our friends believe that the United States is at least partly responsible for China's entry into the Korean War because of MacArthur's crossing the thirty-eighth parallel in defiance of Chinese warnings. And the case against China in Tibet has been somewhat inflated and sentimentalized.

U.S. policy and the future of communism in China

The rigidity of America in its non-recognition and attempted isolation of China now seems to convey sullen hostility and nervous anxiety rather than strength. To much of the world it looks as though we fear that if one domino in our set goes down all the others will fall with it.

Many of our allies have recognized Red China and think that it would be wise for the United States to do so also. They do not take this position because they are soft toward Communism but because they believe that the best way to deal with a difficult power is to deal with it, not ostracize it.

What about the will of China's neighbors to resist Red encroachment? Certainly it is necessary to assure South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well as the less militantly anti-Communist powers of east Asia, that neither the United States nor the United Nations intends to desert them. However, their will to resist Red China surely comes, not primarily from America, but from their own bitter certainty about what Red Chinese aggression or subversion would mean for them. It is

very unlikely that there will be any voluntary defections to the Chinese colossus providing that two conditions are met: first, that these countries are helped to maintain strong internal economies and political health; and, second, that they are assured of defense by the free world.

As for the loyalty of the Chinese living in other nations, it is very doubtful if American attitudes play much part. The amazing renaissance of Chinese power and prestige has already kindled nationalistic pride throughout the Chinese dispersion. On the other hand, these Chinese have been sobered by reports of radical regimentation and exploitation on the mainland in the interests of Communist theory. Their enthusiasm has also been dampened by reports of the tremendous military organization which has been developed. The Chiang Government on Taiwan, now clearly incapable of recapturing the mainland, may provide a haven for some refugees but it cannot effectively compete with Peking as a focus of loyalty for overseas Chinese. The only likely road ahead for these people is effective assimilation into the societies where they reside; or, failing that, reabsorption into the society of mainland China.

The future of Nationalist China on Taiwan

Chiang's value to the United States as an ally is surely not great. It is likely that he represents a liability if military, economic, and psychological values are considered as a whole. And in respect to our obligation to him, his present position is largely due to the failure of his own government while still in control of the mainland and substantially supported by American aid. We are morally obligated not to deliver his government and the people of Taiwan into Communist hands against their will. But surely we have no obligation to encourage the Nationalists in quixotic plans to recapture the mainland. It is just such encouragement that our present policy gives.

Possible gains in a more flexible policy

As to the assertion that a more positive, flexible and exploratory policy toward Red China would do no good one must reply, Why not try it? We are not in a particularly happy position now; our friends are getting weary of voting against Peking's admission to the United Nations; we are tied to a

powder-keg on Quemoy and Matsu. If a general policy of maximum contact, of visits and communication and negotiation, has been found useful in relation to other Communist powers, why not try it in relation to China? Might it not be easier to deal with her inside the forum of the United Nations rather than outside it where she is cut off from all influence except that of her Communist partners?

We must not become prisoner of our past positions. The offshore islands are a prime example of an involvement from which we have refused to extricate ourselves through inertia or stubbornness. It is one which Peking could make extremely embarrassing to us whenever it chose. We need to rethink all such positions constantly so that we keep the initiative and maintain our power of maneuver.

One immense gain which might result from bringing Red China into the society of nations would be the opportunity to include her in negotiations on disarmament. She possesses the largest pool of manpower in the world and perhaps the third most powerful military establishment. Probably she will soon have nuclear weapons. The most pressing business of the world today is to bring the arms race under control, and to get rid of nuclear weapons. Efforts in this direction will be futile unless Red China is party to them.

The sixth point in support of our present policy remains. How can we change without implying a vacillation or even a weakness which would invite disastrous consequences in the thinking of the Red Chinese and possibly in that of other Pacific powers?

Steps toward a new policy

A sound new American policy would consist of a well timed series of specific probes, testing how far Red China can be encouraged to assume a responsible position in the world of nations. At no time need the United States assume a suppliant attitude. Some such sequence of proposals as the following should be made publicly, indicating steps we are prepared to take if China responds with appropriate action:

First, we should offer to develop substantial and increasing contacts between Chinese and Americans, contingent upon release of any citizens now wrongfully held by the other country.

These contacts would include freedom of access for newsmen and scholars, visits by church leaders and others, and eventually liberalized travel for any citizens.

Second, we should work out with our United Nations colleagues clear and realistic proposals for settling the Korean question, tying these to further advances in relationships.

Third, we should propose terms for settling the status of Taiwan along the line of "two Chinas." The Peking regime would be accepted as the government of the mainland. Taiwan would be put under United Nations guarantee and its people eventually given an opportunity to state their political preference in a free plebiscite. It is argued that neither Chiang Kaishek nor Mao Tse-tung will accept such a settlement. But surely it is beside the point to speak of what so completely dependent a regime as Chiang's will or will not accept. And whether or not Mao will accept this, especially if it is the price for United Nations membership, is just what we need to find out.

Fourth, we should make a proposal regarding membership of the two Chinas in the United Nations. Taiwan would have representation in the General Assembly appropriate to a small power. Peking would probably have a seat in the Security Council, possibly along with India for whom a new one might be created.

Fifth, when some such steps as these have been taken, we can profitably explore American recognition of Red China. We shall then know whether or not she wants it and will accept it decently. (Britain is still cooling her heels in the ante-room of diplomatic relations ten years after offering recognition.) And we should then be in a position to extend recognition without seeming weak or suppliant, for we should be extending it to a power which would have taken several long strides on the road to good citizenship in the international community.

On the other hand, if Red China utterly refuses to cooperate in the kind of give and take outlined here, she will reveal to the whole world her continuing unfitness for such citizenship. An appropriate extension of the present American policy will then have to be thought out.



Church life in China today

n 1949, when the Communists took over Mainland China, Protestant Christianity had been in China for nearly 150 years, and Roman Catholicism for about 350 years. Considering the total population of China, which a Communist census showed to be in the neighborhood of 600 million, the one million Protestants and three million Catholics in China in 1949 make but a small minority of that great population. Christianity had, however, made a much greater impression upon China than those figures might indicate, for among the educated and influential classes the percentage of Christians was much higher than for the population as a whole.

By 1949 missionaries were no longer directing church policy in China. But they were there in large numbers, assisting the churches in tasks which were still beyond the strength of the

By Francis P. Jones, Director of Literature Program, Board of Founders, Nanking Theological Seminary; and Editor, The China Bulletin. small groups of baptized Christians. A large part of the church, however, had been obliged to get along without missionary help during the years of the war with Japan, and this was now shown to have been an invaluable apprenticeship in self-reliance.

All missionaries were withdrawn by 1951

As the tidal wave of Communism swept over China, many of the missionaries withdrew with the retreating Nationalist armies. But not all-the Communists found a sizeable force of missionaries at work in all parts of China. At first, these were not molested. For some of us (the writer was in Nanking until December 1950) the chief restriction upon our activities was that we were not allowed to leave the city in which we resided. But the Korean War brought such an outbreak of anti-American feeling, an attitude sedulously fostered by the Government, that it became impossible for American missionaries to continue effective work with their Chinese colleagues. And so during the latter half of 1950 and all of 1951 the missionaries that were still in China were forced, one by one, to give up their work and return home. By the end of 1951 the Bamboo Curtain had fallen, completely separating the younger Chinese Church from its older sisters in the West.

The faith of Chinese Christians is strong

Many in the West took it for granted that with the withdrawal of the missionaries the church in China came to an end. A little reflection would of course show the absurdity of such a supposition. Chinese Christians had already shown the world in many unmistakable ways that their faith in Christ was founded upon a rock—in the International Missionary Council Conference at Madras in 1938 Chinese delegates had dominated the meeting with their courageous and constructive Christian witness. Those of us who knew these Chinese Christian leaders were convinced that the departure of the missionaries would not mean the end of their faith. At the same time we knew that their faith would be facing tests more severe than anything we could imagine. And so from the scattered ranks of the ex-China missionaries—now redeployed all round the world in other mission stations-and from the innumerable friends of China in the West there went up to the throne of God a constant prayer for these Christians with whom we could no longer hold visible fellowship.

But effective prayer must be informed prayer. And by this time all the official channels of information had been cut off. Chinese Christian leaders could not write letters to their friends in the West. Wild rumors were afloat, adding to the anxieties of the friends of China. In this situation the China Committee of the National Council of Churches undertook to supply the information that was needed, by publishing a bi-weekly *China Bulletin*. This became a printed publication in February 1952.

Reliable information about the church in China is available

The sources of fairly reliable information about what was going on in the Christian Church in China have been surprisingly numerous. The outstanding Christian magazine in China, Tien Feng (Heavenly Breeze), has continued to be published in Shanghai, first as a weekly, and more recently on a twice-amonth basis. We have been able to secure (sometimes, I fear, by devious smuggling methods) almost a complete file of this magazine for the past ten critical years. Personal letters informative of church conditions also continue to come out of China—not many, but a steady trickle. And postal connections are actually as open as they ever were. A Christian in Soochow wrote a letter on September 20, 1959, addressed to a friend in New Jersey. She put air mail postage on it, and ten days later it was delivered at its destination.

Another important source of information has been the continual stream of visitors to China. These have even included officially invited church delegations. In 1955 six British Quakers responded to an invitation from the Chinese Church and traveled throughout China, being welcomed by the Christians wherever they went. Two of them had previously been missionaries in China, and so they had a basis for judging the changes which they saw. There have been two important visits from delegations of Australian Christians to China. In 1956 a party of Australian Anglicans visited churches all over China, and in the summer of 1959 another group representing Australian free churches spent a week in China.

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN CHINA TODAY

From these various sources it has been possible for us to piece together a fairly definite picture of what has happened to the Christian Church in China. It is a picture filled with both discouraging and encouraging elements.

Church membership fell but is rising

There is much that is discouraging. Church membership dropped drastically in the first two or three years of Communist control, as those whose faith was not strong decided to drop a connection that would prove difficult in their relations with this new atheistic ideology. A rough estimate is that the membership dropped about 40 per cent, and then gradually began to recover as some of the backsliders returned and as new converts kept coming into the Church. A well informed Christian leader in Shanghai estimated recently that Protestant membership is now up to about 75 per cent of its 1949 mark.

Many in the West feel that those who still call themselves Christian have been obliged so to compromise their Christian faith by their subservience to communism that they can no longer be thought of as true Christians. And compromise there undoubtedly has been. No Christian leader who is at all critical of the new regime has been allowed to stay in office or continue his Christian work. Many of those most highly respected have spent years in prison—Episcopal Bishop Kimber Den, Methodist Bishop W. Y. Chen, the leaders of such indigenous sects as the True Jesus Church, the Little Flock, and the Jesus Family, and the man who is probably the most widely known evangelist in China, Wang Ming-tao. A Government which ill-treats some of its citizens in this way cannot be looked upon with favor, no matter what accomplishments it may claim in the field of social and economic relationships.

Physical work leaves little time for the church

A still more ominous portent has developed during the past two years. There has been a demonic drive to increase production—the Great Leap Forward. The whole population has been mobilized for such exacting physical labors that there has literally been no time or strength left for any other activities. When in the summer of 1958 the 65 churches in Peking were reduced in number to four, the justification given in the *Tien Feng* magazine was that four churches were enough, because on a given Sunday morning in Peking not more than about 500

people were in church. And this in a city where, before he was put in prison, Wang Ming-tao himself had a congregation of a thousand or more every Sunday. Every pastor and Bible woman has to take part in this labor drive, and that necessarily cuts down on sermon preparation and pastoral visiting. Will this young and comparatively untried church be able to survive in a society where literally every other interest is submerged beneath the drive for greater material production?

Strange to say, the confidence of Christian leaders in the future of the church does not seem to waver. They believe that God is leading through all the turmoil of the present period into a richer and fuller life for Christians. They believe that he will not abandon his church. They are confident that the Government's announced policy of freedom of religious belief is sufficient to guarantee the continuance of the Christian Church. The latest copy of *Tien Feng* to arrive speaks of new converts coming up for baptism.

Christian leaders still express their faith boldly

Bishop K. H. Ting published an article two years ago entitled "Christian Theism." In it he refuted the Communist charge that religion is an opiate of the people, and charged instead that it is atheism which is the true opiate; atheism drugs the conscience so that a man may continue in sin.

The leader of the whole Protestant Christian movement in China today is a YMCA Secretary, Y. T. Wu. Many have charged him with spiritual apostasy, with having prostituted the gospel to a subservience to Communism. I cannot approve of all that he has said and done. But I believe that his faith in Christ remains strong. Four or five years ago he wrote a series of articles which were published in *Tien Feng*. One of these closed with the following stirring exhortation:

Sometimes one of my discouraged Christian friends says to me: "Has the Christian Church really any future in China?" That is a strange question to be on the lips of a professing Christian. What has happened to his faith? Can he believe that the God who made all things by the word of his power and upholds them by his providence, has worked until today and tomorrow will suddenly stop working? Has he forgotten that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever? Does he think that the same Holy Spirit which worked in his heart to produce conviction of sin,

and repentance, and belief, and in the hearts of countless other Christians, will suddenly stop working in human hearts? Not so. The eternal Triune God does not change with the times. It is not the power of God, but our own faithfulness, that we need to be concerned about. If we are faithful, he will open up for us roads to witness for him.

And so, although the schools and the hospitals which we have built are gone, and although many of the church buildings of the past now no longer resound with the praise of God, still as long as there are faithful and courageous souls in China bearing witness to the creative and redemptive power of God, the missionary movement which was the human means of bringing that faith into existence will have justified itself.

Two statements

call for change in U.S. policy toward China

One paragraph in "The Message to the Churches" from the Fifth World Order Study Conference recommended inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and its recognition by the U.S.A. The Conference which met in Cleveland in November 1958 was sponsored by the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches. In February 1959, the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ recommended similar action providing certain conditions are met. These two statements follow:

FIFTH WORLD ORDER STUDY CONFERENCE

With reference to China, Christians should urge reconsideration by our government of its policy in regard to the People's Republic of China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan and of Korea should be safeguarded, steps should be taken toward the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government. Such recognition does

not imply approval. These diplomatic relations should constitute a part of a much wider relationship between our peoples. The exclusion of the effective government on the mainland of China, currently the People's Republic of China, from the international community is in many ways a disadvantage to that community. It helps to preserve a false image of the United States and of other nations in the minds of the Chinese people. It keeps our people in ignorance of what is taking place in China. It hampers negotiations for disarmament. It limits the functioning of international organizations. We have a strong hope that the resumption of relationships between the peoples of China and of the United States may make possible also a restoration of relationships between their churches and ours.

Excerpt from "The Message to the Churches" adopted by the Fifth World Order Study Conference convened by the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches, November 18-21, 1958, Cleveland, Ohio.

COUNCIL FOR CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ACTION

We believe that world order, justice, and peace would, under certain conditions, be better served by the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and its recognition by our Government than by continuing the present situation. Among the conditions are: a settlement in Korea and international agreements protecting all the people on Taiwan.

The People's Republic of China, the government in effective control of mainland China, with its more than 600 million people, is excluded from the United Nations and is not recognized by the government of the United States. In meetings of the United Nations the United States has played a prominent part in opposing repeated attempts to submit the question of the representation of the People's Republic of China to discussion and vote by the member nations. The only Chinese government represented in the United Nations and recognized by the United States is the government of the Republic of China whose jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan and some adjacent islands.

This situation involves more than technical diplomatic and political considerations. It is an important component of the whole critical world situation. As Christian citizens, pledged to work for world order, justice, and peace, we must ask ourselves if our country's policy in this area should be continued or changed.

We are aware that the aggressive policy of the Peiping government has not been in accord with acceptable standards of international conduct. Nor can the American people be expected to be indifferent toward internal policies of the regime which deny basic human rights. We take account, also, of the fear that the Communist government of China may, as a result of admission to the United Nations and recognition by the United States, gain some prestige among the free peoples of Asia. We make no claim that such membership and recognition will, of themselves, bring about desirable changes in the international conduct of the People's Republic of China.

We take for granted that diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China will not carry any implication of approval of the regime, any more than approval is implied in United States recognition of a number of other governments.

Among the considerations which seem to us to call for a change in United States policy are the following:

- 1. All independent nations should, we believe, be represented in the United Nations as members, providing they accept the Charter requirements. The government of the Republic of China, now on Taiwan, cannot represent the views and policies of mainland China. It can hardly be expected that United Nations discussion of disputes in which China is involved will be given consideration by China if the nation may not be heard through its own representative. If, in achieving world order, our main reliance is to be on discussion, persuasion, and adjustment, exposure to criticism and appeal and opportunity for each nation to state its own case in a representative international organization are vitally important.
- 2. Crucially important negotiations for the control and reduction of arms, for an inspection system to supervise the ending of nuclear weapons testing and for warnings against surprise attack cannot be carried to successful conclusion without the participation of all the great powers, of which China is one.
- 3. Aside from difficulties caused by specifically communist policies, some Asian governments and many of the people of China may well interpret our policy of exclusion as a contem-

porary expression of a much older habit of assumed racial and national superiority.

- 4. We do not believe that the present United States China policy is the best way to promote freedom and democracy in Asia. In the uncommitted countries this policy is widely believed to put too much emphasis on military power and to constitute Western intervention in the domestic affairs of Asian countries. United States influence on behalf of democracy should depend more on strong support of non-communist countries, such as India, and on demonstration of our opposition to colonialism, racialism and war.
- 5. Non-recognition by our government keeps Americans in ignorance of what is going on in China. Chinese Christians are cut off from association with the churches of the United States. We believe, as a matter of general and fundamental policy, in encouraging the greatest possible degree of communication between the world's peoples, however sharp their political and cultural differences. The travel and cultural exchange which the United States encourages in the case of other communist countries is, under present policy, made impossible in the case of China. Permission to United States newspaper and magazine correspondents to report from China should be a first step in establishing communication.

It is our conviction that the changes here recommended do not mean any lessening of vigilance or of concern for the freedom and security of non-communist nations. World peace and justice will not be served by appeasement. But neither are they served by policies which limit our freedom to respond to changing situations and to test new approaches to the settlement of controversies.

Adopted by the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ, February 1959.

+ + + + + +

A PACKET ON U.S. CHINA POLICY is available from the Cleveland and New York offices of the Council for Christian Social Action. It contains background information and questions for discussion. The cost is 50ϕ .



CHINA TODAY

The Red Mandarins, by Karl Eskelund. London: Alvin Redman, Ltd., 1959, 175 pp.

Dragon and Sickle, by Guy Wint. London: Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1958, 109 pp.

Impatient Giant: Red China Today, by Gerald Clark. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 212 pp.

600 Million Chinese, by Robert Guillain. New York: Criterion Books, 1957, 310 pp.

Communist China Today, by Peter S. H. Tang. New York: Praeger, 1957, 536 pp.

Books on Communist China share at least one common feature: recency. Senator Henry Jackson has lately commented that the prostrate colossus of ten years ago is today a giant on the march. Americans can glimpse some things that are happening by pressing noses against windows provided through first-hand observations of those allowed to visit the country and its people. These annotations describe a few of the many recent writings:

The Red Mandarins is by a Danish journalist who in earlier years studied at Yenching Uni-

versity and who married a Chinese. Their return to a country previously well known to them made it possible to gauge some of the differences resulting under the present regime: no beggars; clean trains, running on time: tireless pursuit of dirt and flies; hope that a series of great dams on waterways would end the bottomless sorrows of floods. But one price of these changes was indicated by an old friend of the journalist's earlier days in China: "... It is all logic and principles and production. And there is no real friendship any more-not like in the old days. You never talk to anyone about the things that really matter" (p. 65). The book is written with humor and, one judges, with perceptiveness.

Dragon and Sickle is by a British author, a writer on international subjects, and one versed in political science. The book concerns the unique methods developed by the Chinese Communists for the seizure and control of economic and political power, and the resulting implications for other Asian countries. Mao Tse-tung linked the great force of an aroused peasantry with Communist dogmas, and developed a state guided by

"democratic centralism." Success came, the author says, through "the revolutionary army, the secure base, the encircling of the towns" (p. 49). Yet new strategies appear now,—"revisionism" which allows a certain latitude, as for example in some Asian countries Communist cooperation with nationalists in parliamentary relations, suggesting that "even in the Communist world, events are shaped by resourceful men of action rather than by dogmatists" (p. 91).

Impatient Giant reflects observations of an able Canadian newsman who visited the country in 1958. Indoctrination, propaganda, manners and morals. the People's Communes-these were topics this visiting reporter rigorously pursued. He concludes that the regime is firmly entrenched, and that China's experience with communism is having a great impact on other Asian nations, saying: "If, to Asians, it becomes clear that the Chinese system . . . can offer an alternative more promising than any provided by free enterprise, it will be virtually impossible to restain the swell that local communist parties will be able to command" (p. 187). He believes that Canada and the U.S. should recognize Red China diplomatically, arguing that the West cannot bypass the strength of 650,-000,000 people (p. 198).

600 Million Chinese is a view through a French window; the author is a French reporter who had experience in pre-Communist China. On a recent visit he found such evidence of material progress that "China is unrecognizable." It has come rapidly, but he argues that the "results are average in a world where everything is changing at amazing speed" (p. 62). The author's conclusions are epitomized in the title of Chapter 19: "Material Achievement: Remarkable; Spiritual Achievement: Terrifying."

One word is the key to material change: productivity. Twenty per cent of the national revenue, the author claims, is invested in new industries. Beneficiary of the intense toil of the laborer is the collective. The material achievements cannot be doubted. The price has been what he calls "the socialization of brains." The point is central for this observer from the West. "Mass Production of Right Thinkers" is the aim of a system of perpetual supervision. The collective economy brings benefits to the peasant. It is not these benefits, however, that explain his participation. The methods of indoctrination are such that "the peasant has no alternative but to wish what he is supposed to wish" (p. 198). He adds that one of the surprising aspects of this upheaval "is that the civilization now establishing itself in China is a borrowed one" and he continues that "The beacon of Asia, the mother of thought and art, has become a mere imitator" (p. 258). Yet this fact may not be apparent to the people making up what the author chracterizes as a vast ant hill. For they see the results of practical efficiency and the indubitable fact that China has become again a world power. Since there will be a billion Chinese by 1980, judging from the present annual net increase of 15,000,000, the portent for the future of Asia and of the world looms large.

Communist China Today was written by a Chinese scholar to examine the roots of international communism and to give a "comprehensive interpretation of communism in action in China." The first one hundred pages furnish background, ideological and historical. In Chapters 4-9 inclusive, the central term is machine-party, state, economic, social, military, propaganda. The remaining chapters deal with impacts of Chinese Communism on other parts of the world,---the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, southeast Asia, the West. In a new edition to appear in 1960 there will be added chapters on religious and cultural aspects of communism in China.

The second chapter, "Historical Background," furnishes a convenient and incisive summary of the course of events within China which eventuated in the taking over of governmental power by the Communists in 1949, dating from movements beginning just after World War I. A valuable feature is a selected bibliography (in six languages). The author, Dr. Tang, after studying at the Cen-

tral Political Institute in China in pre-Communist days, spent five years in diplomatic service in the U.S.S.R., and is now a member of the faculty of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. The book serves admirably for reference as well as informative reading.

EVERETT M. STOWE, a member of the staff of the World Council for Christian Education; formerly a missionary in China.

RECEIVED TOO LATE FOR REVIEW

Communist China and Asia, by A. Doak Barnett. New York: Harper and Brothers, \$6.95.

What does the continuing growth in Communist China's strength and influence mean for the future of the free countries of Asia and for the United States policy? What are the principal ways in which the Chinese Communist regime exerts its power at home and abroad? What policies can best serve American interests and those of non-Communist Asia in the next five or ten years?

These questions are dealt with comprehensively in this full-scale study of Communist China and its impact on Asia by an author who was born in China and has devoted his career ever since World War II to an investigation of China's actions and intentions. . . .

—Excerpt from the jacket of the book.



SHOULD THE U.S.A. CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARD CHINA?

The Social Action Committee may wish to engage in preliminary study before involving others in a discussion of the policy of the U.S. toward China. Among the resources it will find useful are:

- The articles on pages 4 to 26 in this issue of Social Action.
- A Packet on U.S. Policy toward China, available from the Cleveland and New York offices of the CCSA for 50¢.
- The Atlantic for December 1959, a special issue on Red China, 8 Arlington St., Boston, Mass., 60¢.
- The books reviewed on pages 30-32.

Hold a consultation

The Social Action Committee might plan a church-wide Consultation on U.S. Policy Toward China—say, from 4:00 to 9:00 p.m. on a Saturday or Sunday. Some suggestions for the program follow:

4:00-4:30: U.S. Policy Toward China—by a professor, a former resident of China, or one who is willing to do preparatory reading.

4:30-5:40: Introduction and showing of the film The Face of Red China.

6:00-7:00: A Chinese Supper.

(If seating could be arranged at small tables, persons who have previewed the film might lead informal discussions of the insight the film gives into life in China today.)

7:00-8:30: Should the U.S.A. Change Its Policy Toward China? Two speakers might present reasons for affirmative and negative answers to this question. Open discussion might follow.

8:30-8:45: Suggested Action for Christians—by a member of the Social Action Committee.

8:45-9:00: Worship, (See Resources for Worship, pages 34-35.)

The film

The Face of Red China was prepared by CBS Television. A 16 mm. black and white print with sound may be rented from the Yeshiva University Film Library, 526 West 187th Street. New York 33, N.Y., for \$12. The running time is 54 minutes. A description of the film and suggestions for its use are in the Packet on U.S. Policy Toward China. The chairman and members of the committee should preview the film in order to introduce it and lead effective discussion of it.

-FERN BABCOCK



FOR GOD'S GUIDANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Scripture

John 17:20-26 Romans 11:33-36

Hymns

Eternal God Whose Power
Upholds
God Is Working His Purpose
Out
These Things Shall Be

Meditation

Respect for being

The world is waiting to be told authoritatively-not by words only but by incarnate being-that the greatest virtue is respect for being; that this is the virtue of love, the love of what is, just because it is: that therefore every man, every tribe, every nation, every culture is worthy of profound respect: that we are all laboring toward an order in which no nation and no culture need fear any diminution in their real being; and that nevertheless if we are all called to examine ourselves critically and in the light of new knowledge, if need be, to change ourselves, this is not the call of disrespect but the call of our deeper being itself which we are not and which we ought to be.

Lord of history

The Christian believes that the world is built on moral foundations because he believes in God, the living God, whose relation to history is not that of spectator but of participant, For the Christian, issues of history are not solely in the hands of natural forces or human forces. . . . The ultimate power in history comes from beyond history. It is not a closed order, naturally determined. It is the sphere of the creative energies of God who is seeking, in and through it, the redemption of the individual and society. This is the faith by which the entire Bible is animated—that God is the Lord of history, controlling its course, inaugurating new eras, raising up great leaders, directing the destinies of nations.

ROBERT J. McCRACKEN
Advance, May 17, 1954

Let us frankly recognize that many of the revolutionary forces of our time are in great part the judgment of God upon human selfishness and complacency, and upon man's forgetfulness of man. That does not make these forces right; it does, however, compel us to consider how their driving power can be channeled into forms of creative thought and work.

JOHN A. MACKAY Letter to Presbyterians, October 21, 1953

Frankly, I stand amazed at the unfathomable complexity of God's wisdom and God's knowledge. How could man ever understand his reasons for action, or explain his methods for working? For:

Who hath known the mind of the Lord?

Or who hath been His counsellor?

Or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?

For of Him, and through Him, and unto Him, are all things.

To Him be the glory forever. Amen.

Romans 11:33-36 J. B. PHILLIPS

Prayer

Eternal God, we pray that we may live redemptively in the face of the many conflicting forces in our world. Living under suspicion, help us to know when we should stand firm on principles, and when we should tactfully yield; when we should attack propaganda in the name of truth, and when we should save our words for more vital issues.

Help us to remember that we are here not only to give but also to learn and so to help others to learn. We are here not only to proclaim a saving truth but to be ourselves corrected and saved in the midst of forces which attack us and all we believe.

In times such as these perhaps it is our task to help others to understand—themselves, their society, and their God—so that knowing their own need of redeem they will seek to redeem even those who betray them.

May we be a fellowship of believers so sure of Thee, of Thy guidance in history, and of Thy victory in Christ, that we do not feel the need of self-defense so much as the need of daily renewal by Thy grace. May we who call ourselves Christian know Thee better as a saviour who judges us as well as our adversary. In the name of Him whom we profess to follow. Amen.¹

—Prepared by Helen Hunt-INGTON SMITH, Director of Women's Work, Ohio Conference of Congregational Christian Churches.

¹ Adapted from a letter written in the early 1950s by a missionary living under the Chinese Communist regime.

social action calendar



- APRIL 26-28: CCSA Washington Seminar, United Church of Christ.*

 Director: Miss Fern Babcock
- JUNE 6-10: Central Christian Social Action Institute. Dunkirk, N. Y.* Dean: Rev. Herman F. Reissig. Cost, \$30.
- JUNE 20-24: West Coast Christian Social Action Institute. Mill Valley, Calif.* Dean: Julian J. Keiser. Cost, \$30.
- JUNE 22-JULY 7: Hawaiian Seminar. Leaders: Rev. and Mrs. Galen R. Weaver. Resource Leader: Rev. Herman F. Reissig. Cost from San Francisco and return, \$692.
- JUNE 22-AUGUST 23: World Seminar. Leaders: Dr. and Mrs. Ray Gibbons. Cost, \$2800.
- JUNE 20-JULY 2: Seventeenth Annual Race Relations Institute, Fisk University, Nashville, Tenn. Director: Dr. Herman H. Long.
- July 11-15: Midwest Christian Social Action Institute. Sheboygan, Wisc.* Dean: Dr. Huber F. Klemme. Cost, \$30.
- JULY 18-22: Southern Christian Social Action Institute, Black Mountain, N. C.* Dean: Rev. James H. Lightbourne, Jr. Cost, \$30.
- JULY 25-29: Eastern Christian Social Action Institute. Framingham, Mass.* Dean: Rev. F. Nelsen Schlegel. Cost, \$30.
- AUGUST 3-22: Mexican Seminar. Leaders: Dr. and Mrs. Huber F. Klemme. Cost, \$295 in Mexico.
- * Limited scholarship help available from the CCSA. Members of CC churches, write Miss Fern Babcock, 289 Park Avenue South, New York 10, New York. E and R members, write the Rev. F. Nelsen Schlegel, 2969 West 25th Street, Cleveland 13, Ohio.

THE CHARLES HOLBROOK LIB PACIFIC SCHOOL OF REL 1798 SCENIC AV BERKELEY 9 CALIF